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The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods - The general case [Data & Replication package] Jun 3, 2022 - AWI Experimental Economics Oechssler, Jörg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis, 2022, "The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods - The general case [Data & Replication package]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/ZPTF1X, heiDATA, V1 We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM), agents send two messages of the form, “I am willing to contribute x units to the public good if in total y units are contributed.” This mechanism offers a...
Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply – experimental evidence [Dataset] Jul 29, 2014 - AWI Experimental Economics Becker, Johannes G.; Damianov, Damian S.; Oechssler, Jörg, 2014, "Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply – experimental evidence [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10013, heiDATA, V1, UNF:5:JkjthKWUQF+SGftTh1TTyg== [fileUNF] In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better f...

The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods - The general case [Data & Replication package]

Jun 3, 2022 - AWI Experimental Economics

Oechssler, Jörg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis, 2022, "The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods - The general case [Data & Replication package]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/ZPTF1X, heiDATA, V1

We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM), agents send two messages of the form, “I am willing to contribute x units to the public good if in total y units are contributed.” This mechanism offers a...

Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply – experimental evidence [Dataset]

Jul 29, 2014 - AWI Experimental Economics

Becker, Johannes G.; Damianov, Damian S.; Oechssler, Jörg, 2014, "Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply – experimental evidence [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10013, heiDATA, V1, UNF:5:JkjthKWUQF+SGftTh1TTyg== [fileUNF]

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better f...

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