1 to 10 of 14 Results
Trautmann, Stefan T.; König-Kersting, Christian, 2016, "Ambiguity Attitudes in Decisions for Others [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10084, heiDATA, V2, UNF:5:+nuSVaYwRhcCKiFHfar1iA== [fileUNF]
We probe the pattern of ambiguity aversion for moderate-likelihood gain prospects, and ambiguity seeking for low-likelihood gain prospects, if people make decisions not for themselves but as agents for others. We confirm the pattern both with and without accountability. |
Dec 20, 2016 - AWI Experimental Economics
Krawczyk, Michal; Trautmann, Stefan T.; van de Kuilen, Gijs, 2016, "Catastrophic Risk: Social Influences on Insurance Decisions [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10096, heiDATA, V1
We study behavioral patterns of insurance demand for low-probability large-loss events (catastrophic losses). Individual patterns of belief formation and risk attitude that were suggested in the behavioral decisions literature emerge robustly in the current set of insurance choic... |
Trinn, Christoph; Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research e.V. (HIIK), 2016, "Disaggregated Conflict Dataset (DISCON) 1.0", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10070, heiDATA, V1
The Disaggregated Conflict Dataset (DISCON) has been jointly released by Dr. Christoph Trinn, Institute for Political Science, Heidelberg, and the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). DISCON is based on a broad-based, integrative concept of conflict. D... |
May 30, 2016 - AWI Experimental Economics
Oechssler, Jörg; Roomets, Alex; Roth, Stefan, 2016, "From imitation to collusion: a replication [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10075, heiDATA, V2, UNF:5:qSzzvlOu2rl8/AR8TIBEEQ== [fileUNF]
In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (J Econ Theory 155:185–205, 2015) qualifies those results in an interes... |
Diederich, Johannes; Goeschl, Timo; Waichman, Israel, 2016, "Group Size and the (In)Efficiency of Pure Public Good Provision [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10069, heiDATA, V1, UNF:5:kp1aULj0nca125TUHszBUg== [fileUNF]
Are larger groups better at cooperation than smaller groups? This paper investigates, under controlled conditions, the presence and direction of a possible group size effect in pure public good provision by large heterogeneous groups. Employing subjects drawn from the general pop... |
Mar 11, 2016
This Dataverse contains research data related to Conflict Research at the Institute for Political Science (IPW). |
Kettner, Sara Elisa; Waichman, Israel, 2016, "Old Age and Prosocial Behavior: Social Preferences or Experimental Confounds? [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10067, heiDATA, V1
Experimental and field evidence indicate a positive link between social preferences and age, most strikingly between the elderly and young adults. However, it is possible that the seemingly positive link between age and preferences stems from confounds in experimental procedure.... |
Waichman, Israel; Voss, Andreas, 2016, "Payment Procedure in a Public Good Game Experiment: The Effects of Endowment Timing, Tangibility, and Source [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10094, heiDATA, V1
We study whether and how payment procedure affects behavior in a repeated public good game. To this end, we conducted five treatments, varying the times of paying the initial endowment (week before, before, or after the decisions) and the source of the initial endowment (windfall... |
Nov 2, 2016
Hier finden Sie Forschungsdaten und weiteres Material zu Artikeln aus Perspektive Bibliothek. |
Jan 28, 2016 - AWI Experimental Economics
Pollmann, Monique; Potters, Jan; Trautmann, Stefan T., 2016, "Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10066, heiDATA, V1, UNF:5:xAMEsbLcHACMf16SEb4syQ== [fileUNF]
We study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal. We observe that in the absence of accountability, agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account. Accountability m... |
