21 to 27 of 27 Results
Oct 28, 2020 - AWI Experimental Economics
Oechssler, Jörg; Roomets, Alex, 2020, "Savage vs. Anscombe-Aumann: an experimental investigation of ambiguity frameworks [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/RTQIUG, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:znXzfO0UeSWMUd6rxjZvVw== [fileUNF]
The Savage and the Anscombe–Aumann frameworks are the two most popular approaches used when modeling ambiguity. The former is more flexible, but the latter is often preferred for its simplicity. We conduct an experiment where subjects place bets on the joint outcome of an ambiguo... |
Dec 11, 2018 - AWI Experimental Economics
Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Vadovic, Radovan, 2014, "Sick Pay Provision in Experimental Labor Markets [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10010, heiDATA, V2, UNF:6:gwZx9SQucrST4uvXCxHw0w== [fileUNF]
Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort? Second, do... |
Jul 30, 2014 - AWI Experimental Economics
Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Jörg, 2014, "Stability of the Cournot Process - Experimental Evidence [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10014, heiDATA, V1
We report results of experiments designed to test the predictions of the best-reply process. In a Cournot oligopoly with four firms, the best-reply process should theoretically explode if demand and cost functions are linear. We find, however, no experimental evidence of such ins... |
Mar 22, 2018 - AWI Experimental Economics
Reischmann, Andreas; Oechssler, Jörg, 2018, "The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision in dynamic settings - Theory and experimental evidence [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/QHN1KT, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:oGAQOEsaP2z2MtFReyc6Uw== [fileUNF]
We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM), every agent's message has the form, “I am willing to contribute to the public good if at least k agents contribute in total.” This mechanism offer... |
Jun 3, 2022 - AWI Experimental Economics
Oechssler, Jörg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis, 2022, "The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods - The general case [Data & Replication package]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/ZPTF1X, heiDATA, V1
We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM), agents send two messages of the form, “I am willing to contribute x units to the public good if in total y units are contributed.” This mechanism offers a... |
Jul 31, 2014 - AWI Experimental Economics
Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Jörg, 2014, "Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopoly [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10017, heiDATA, V1, UNF:5:ZO79Xsj/X7piQu3p8pQheg== [fileUNF]
In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and f... |
Jul 29, 2014 - AWI Experimental Economics
Becker, Johannes G.; Damianov, Damian S.; Oechssler, Jörg, 2014, "Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply – experimental evidence [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10013, heiDATA, V1, UNF:5:JkjthKWUQF+SGftTh1TTyg== [fileUNF]
In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better f... |