AWI Experimental Economics

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Author Name: Schmidt, Robert

1 to 6 of 6 Results

Implementing (Un)fair Procedures: Containing Favoritism When Unequal Outcomes are Inevitable [Dataset] Oct 25, 2021 Schmidt, Robert; Trautmann, Stefan T., 2021, "Implementing (Un)fair Procedures: Containing Favoritism When Unequal Outcomes are Inevitable [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/APBF7C, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:nKEA/QBp0/zEXIMhsTG2og== [fileUNF] We study the selection of people when unequal payoffs are inevitable, but fair procedures are feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job. We show that allocators may be influenced by their similarity with a recipi- ent, leading to favoritism in outcome...
The Value of Verbal Feedback in Allocation Decisions [Online Appendix and Replication Package] Jun 9, 2020 Schmidt, Robert; Schwieren, Christiane; Vollmann, Martin, 2020, "The Value of Verbal Feedback in Allocation Decisions [Online Appendix and Replication Package]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/R1CRC4, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:RqKCP9A+dpAnUs1M3/27cA== [fileUNF] Depending on the context at hand, people’s preference for receiving feedback might differ. Especially in allocation decisions that directly concern another individual, feedback from the affected person can have positive or negative value. We study such preferences in a laboratory...
Capitalizing on the (False) Consensus Effect: Two Tractable Methods to Elicit Private Information [Dataset] Nov 4, 2019 Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Capitalizing on the (False) Consensus Effect: Two Tractable Methods to Elicit Private Information [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/7WGSTU, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:NNk+dDpsSu2ZXVMSVkJtQQ== [fileUNF] We propose and experimentally test two tractable methods to incentivize the elicitation of private information: Benchmark and Coordination. Both mechanisms capitalize on the false consensus effect, a well-documented phenomenon that follows Bayesian reasoning. That is, individuals...
Do Injunctive or Descriptive Social Norms Elicited Using Coordination Games Better Explain Social Preferences? [Dataset] Nov 4, 2019 Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Do Injunctive or Descriptive Social Norms Elicited Using Coordination Games Better Explain Social Preferences? [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/Z7IKIU, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:naic0kj9nUrUokAIwMt12A== [fileUNF] We experimentally study the relationship between social norms and social preferences on the individual level. Subjects coordinate on injunctive and descriptive norms, and we test which type of norm is more strongly related to behavior in a series of dictator games. Our experiment...
Point Beauty Contest: Measuring the Distribution of Focal Points on the Individual Level [Dataset] Nov 4, 2019 Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Point Beauty Contest: Measuring the Distribution of Focal Points on the Individual Level [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/PA87NV, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:XeJX5PG6nEvxhO8ACToIDQ== [fileUNF] We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a mechanism to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows for nuanced coordination strategies, as subjects can inv...
Norms in the Lab: Inexperienced versus Experienced Participants Sep 30, 2019 Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Norms in the Lab: Inexperienced versus Experienced Participants", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/SS8CBF, heiDATA, V2, UNF:6:4c/ba9USuo/U6JX/7Gh1Mw== [fileUNF] Using coordination games, we study whether social norm perception differs between inexperienced and experienced participants in economic laboratory experiments. We find substantial differences between the two groups, both regarding injunctive and descriptive social norms in the c...

Implementing (Un)fair Procedures: Containing Favoritism When Unequal Outcomes are Inevitable [Dataset]

Oct 25, 2021

Schmidt, Robert; Trautmann, Stefan T., 2021, "Implementing (Un)fair Procedures: Containing Favoritism When Unequal Outcomes are Inevitable [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/APBF7C, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:nKEA/QBp0/zEXIMhsTG2og== [fileUNF]

We study the selection of people when unequal payoffs are inevitable, but fair procedures are feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job. We show that allocators may be influenced by their similarity with a recipi- ent, leading to favoritism in outcome...

The Value of Verbal Feedback in Allocation Decisions [Online Appendix and Replication Package]

Jun 9, 2020

Schmidt, Robert; Schwieren, Christiane; Vollmann, Martin, 2020, "The Value of Verbal Feedback in Allocation Decisions [Online Appendix and Replication Package]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/R1CRC4, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:RqKCP9A+dpAnUs1M3/27cA== [fileUNF]

Depending on the context at hand, people’s preference for receiving feedback might differ. Especially in allocation decisions that directly concern another individual, feedback from the affected person can have positive or negative value. We study such preferences in a laboratory...

Capitalizing on the (False) Consensus Effect: Two Tractable Methods to Elicit Private Information [Dataset]

Nov 4, 2019

Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Capitalizing on the (False) Consensus Effect: Two Tractable Methods to Elicit Private Information [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/7WGSTU, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:NNk+dDpsSu2ZXVMSVkJtQQ== [fileUNF]

We propose and experimentally test two tractable methods to incentivize the elicitation of private information: Benchmark and Coordination. Both mechanisms capitalize on the false consensus effect, a well-documented phenomenon that follows Bayesian reasoning. That is, individuals...

Do Injunctive or Descriptive Social Norms Elicited Using Coordination Games Better Explain Social Preferences? [Dataset]

Nov 4, 2019

Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Do Injunctive or Descriptive Social Norms Elicited Using Coordination Games Better Explain Social Preferences? [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/Z7IKIU, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:naic0kj9nUrUokAIwMt12A== [fileUNF]

We experimentally study the relationship between social norms and social preferences on the individual level. Subjects coordinate on injunctive and descriptive norms, and we test which type of norm is more strongly related to behavior in a series of dictator games. Our experiment...

Point Beauty Contest: Measuring the Distribution of Focal Points on the Individual Level [Dataset]

Nov 4, 2019

Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Point Beauty Contest: Measuring the Distribution of Focal Points on the Individual Level [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/PA87NV, heiDATA, V1, UNF:6:XeJX5PG6nEvxhO8ACToIDQ== [fileUNF]

We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a mechanism to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows for nuanced coordination strategies, as subjects can inv...

Norms in the Lab: Inexperienced versus Experienced Participants

Sep 30, 2019

Schmidt, Robert, 2019, "Norms in the Lab: Inexperienced versus Experienced Participants", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/SS8CBF, heiDATA, V2, UNF:6:4c/ba9USuo/U6JX/7Gh1Mw== [fileUNF]

Using coordination games, we study whether social norm perception differs between inexperienced and experienced participants in economic laboratory experiments. We find substantial differences between the two groups, both regarding injunctive and descriptive social norms in the c...

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