Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally [Dataset]doi:10.11588/data/10021heiDATA2014-08-012Apesteguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Jörg; Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014, "Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10021, heiDATA, V2, UNF:5:9uTZvsy6tiSJe0U8/cdxPw== [fileUNF]Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally [Dataset]doi:10.11588/data/10021Apesteguia, JoseHuck, SteffenOechssler, JörgWeidenholzer, SimonApesteguia, JoseHuck, SteffenOechssler, JörgWeidenholzer, SimonHeidelberg, GermanyheiDATAHeiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data RepositoryOechssler, Jörg2014-07-31Social SciencesEvolutionary game theoryStochastic stabilityImitationCournot marketsInformationExperimentsSimulationsC72C91C92D43L13A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) [18] implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopolies, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome. We show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in costs, since every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical predictio
n, the Walrasian outcome is a good predictor of market outcomes. Finally, we suggest a new theory based on a mix of imitation and other learning processes that explains subjects' behavior fairly well.GermanyGermanyStudentsApesteguia, Jose; Huck, Jose; Oechssler, Jörg; Weidenhölzer, Simon, "Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust", Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2010), 1603-1617.10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.014Apesteguia, Jose; Huck, Jose; Oechssler, Jörg; Weidenhölzer, Simon, "Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust", Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2010), 1603-1617.data JET 2010 AHOW.tab270059text/tab-separated-valuesUNF:5:9uTZvsy6tiSJe0U8/cdxPw==UNF:5:oVABWy5UCUqgedMqX+UYTA==UNF:5:Mxmq0qsMjYBilebPAvCyHQ==UNF:5:8vYQdencmzZnlW7uYi6zZQ==UNF:5:XoBuiktSrSUCWaXF3RQPbQ==UNF:5:8nK9P2TOd0eCbl6r4DMC6g==UNF:5:964reCYN5+km7ri0WxU9mg==quantitiesUNF:5:Nto5tzvav8qcisjB/Ml9Vg==UNF:5:U+lz/ebgs+9uI88c3iovGA==UNF:5:A9ryEBwQ/PdIoaVTXEwbUg==UNF:5:hMnkmvRUHWwKhitjQILFgQ==UNF:5:dkA5ajAxMVT907eEdtO2Mg==UNF:5:hi1Ppxfz1dGzFVHEnoie4g==UNF:5:AXEX/uA84uivYMFefA7Uog==UNF:5:OST2vewPAV+cxp6Gadzr9g==UNF:5:xPNLYfigut4DFveS0Vrr/g==UNF:5:R3bwFbec+r9brd51a0LCPg==UNF:5:HAQeDJLU/7zmCNzauSlJgg==UNF:5:vNXMzHLrTv1/7Gv5UPNrxw==UNF:5:i9xZSiLFKfNRpqzFeVaSxA==UNF:5:AFXDs/gyUV4pkkJ9+rNWnw==UNF:5:FnRx+YkDkxoYc3f6lAsyQA==UNF:5:00Z1gbzlSOscbq0b3SVcWA==UNF:5:WHhWGlCraiEUATmMU01FbQ==Treat="g0" (FILTER)1Seleccionado00No seleccionado0UNF:5:fXmiM7sd663Z3MfW8FO8KQ==UNF:5:h3u3mTZ3YONwiEytSNHaIQ==UNF:5:F5vemVf/ZMhRfad4amJepw==UNF:5:t69z/CIgVsrB/0NOUWnmdw==UNF:5:RGa8DfRE6Cknip86wF60lg==UNF:5:bHcMILwfRdKFh9BVcUDd0A==UNF:5:7dSorJ/iL9ZgP44livDclQ==UNF:5:avNxUlFsj8Vw1T7R+EaSjA==UNF:5:xxBbBnazzrEs4BR6QRzp6w==UNF:5:Nf5ZdH7lgog725MyMzAbbQ==UNF:5:w/o4Jx2vuak2J30sQDQybQ==UNF:5:IknO/tyaDSx0LvZM1TXPyw==UNF:5:2Mj3ySuaygRI9EPQ5yEATA==UNF:5:H+fPeEsZ4koBM6v9rLe//A==UNF:5:QAi0Jvk3XZZu7+IiOAPVeQ==UNF:5:L1AchZOqu/dsncapxAs40A==UNF:5:mT4IBFyRc8CakMr2zZQU5g==UNF:5:Zf8+iOfwgyOywCuh/RYVhQ==UNF:5:qxfkAt+NaekSbCGAL/Xu1g==UNF:5:USa7ycfDnwYKs4OyDHpOmQ==UNF:5:cjIN02MNpimFZ1DfTiPGNg==UNF:5:BTPsGlXHkxaUq3W9RxoEFw==UNF:5:UtkrbU/AEEZbir/EgwtyCA==UNF:5:5guMKp+A1+5IyxYW/PGHEg==UNF:5:KdQouVgg6uMRcblnWy7fYg==UNF:5:r3wqpIGvwXtpZuuIH67kng==UNF:5:/YgIOMCHa0fOgjqQGIwuWQ==UNF:5:mvGIHidS6cIrTaL83LKLIg==UNF:5:zi/siOhET5R5BqGnz8Mx0A==UNF:5:xkggcBQVZpAbkVSc0ke+tA==UNF:5:UUNk3mFeFlhLVMpPXlCYcQ==UNF:5:zHTjf89Agij46cl40+65/g==UNF:5:16cuiy42I8Bvoz3nBAfXcQ==UNF:5:LjPt3pBFURmyue9mhPyPTQ==UNF:5:ht4E4d+l92pdutStBUw0+w==UNF:5:kevYHvVJLmWL0vet5dF7BA==data JET 2010 AHOW.xlsxOpenXML - Spreadsheet formatapplication/octet-streamLZA.tar.gzThis file is for internal use only.application/x-gzip