10.11588/data/10049
Waichman, Israel(Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)Requate, TillSiang, Ch’ng Kean
Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study [Dataset]
heiDATA
2015
doi:10.11588/data/10049/W01BARdoi:10.11588/data/10049/8IAPCQdoi:10.11588/data/10049/DUVZMJdoi:10.11588/data/10049/7K5E0Qdoi:10.11588/data/10049/W7RQJLdoi:10.11588/data/10049/MDYHOZdoi:10.11588/data/10049/WD1OMCdoi:10.11588/data/10049/PYRLVCdoi:10.11588/data/10049/IWTF7Cdoi:10.11588/data/10049/VAZHR9doi:10.11588/data/10049/AMNAXIdoi:10.11588/data/10049/I2XTH2doi:10.11588/data/10049/7MZAHKdoi:10.11588/data/10049/Y97GS5doi:10.11588/data/10049/JSPCIN
This study investigates the impact of communication on outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a ‘standardized-communication’ and a ‘free-communication’ device. Using both students and managers as subjects, we find that managers behave in a similar way under both communication devices, while students collude slightly better under free than under standardized communication. Second, while under standardized communication managers select lower outputs than students, we observe no difference in subject pools under free communication. Finally, we observe more collusion in duopoly than in triopoly.
Waichman, Israel(Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)Waichman, Israel(Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)Requate, Till(Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)Siang, Ch’ng Kean(Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)