10.11588/data/10004Trautmann, Stefan T.Stefan T.TrautmannAlfred-Weber-Institute of EconomicsKuilen, Gijs van deGijs van deKuilenBelief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums [Dataset]heiDATA2014Social Sciencesbelief measurementsubjective probabilityscoring rulesoutcome matchingprobability matchingD81C83C91Trautmann, Stefan T.Stefan T.TrautmannAlfred-Weber-Institute of EconomicsTrautmann, Stefan T.Stefan T.TrautmannAlfred-Weber-Institute of EconomicsKuilen, Gijs van deGijs van deKuilenHeiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data RepositoryUniversity of Heidelberg20142014-05-262019-06-0610.1111/ecoj.12160962427719209004148788126182809502125052871502210733532682566623150892277411913292214767112853757736452text/tab-separated-valuestext/tab-separated-valuesapplication/octet-streamtext/plain; charset=US-ASCIIapplication/x-gzipapplication/octet-streamtext/plain; charset=US-ASCIIapplication/octet-streamtext/plain; charset=US-ASCIIapplication/octet-streamtext/plain; charset=US-ASCIIapplication/octet-streamtext/plain; charset=US-ASCIIapplication/octet-streamtext/plain; charset=US-ASCIIapplication/pdftext/x-stata-syntax; charset=US-ASCIIapplication/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheetapplication/x-stata-syntax3.1We pit non-incentivized introspection against five revealed preference mechanisms (“truth serums”) in the elicitation of beliefs in a simple two-player game. We measure the additivity, the predictive power for own behaviour, and the accuracy of each method. Beliefs from incentivized methods are better predictors of participants’ own behaviour compared to introspection. However, introspection performs equally well as the truth serums in terms of accuracy and additivity. We also find that correction for risk aversion improves the additivity of scoring-rule belief reports.3.2.11, 3.2.11