Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs] (doi:10.11588/data/10087)

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Part 2: Study Description
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs]

Identification Number:

doi:10.11588/data/10087

Distributor:

heiDATA

Date of Distribution:

2016-10-20

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Vanberg, Christoph, 2016, "Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10087, heiDATA, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs]

Identification Number:

doi:10.11588/data/10087

Authoring Entity:

Vanberg, Christoph (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)

Producer:

Vanberg, Christoph

Date of Production:

2016

Distributor:

heiDATA

Distributor:

heiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data Repository

Access Authority:

Christoph Vanberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany, Phone: +49 6221 54 2912, Fax: +49 6221 54 3592

Date of Deposit:

2016-10-18

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10087

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Lying, Deception, Morality, Ethics, Experiments

Topic Classification:

C91, D83

Abstract:

I experimentally investigate the hypothesis that many people avoid lying even in a situation where doing so would result in a Pareto improvement. Replicating (Erat and Gneezy, Management Science 58, 723-733, 2012), I find that a significant fraction of subjects tell the truth in a sender-receiver game where both subjects earn a higher payoff when the partner makes an incorrect guess regarding the roll of a die. However, a non-incentivized questionnaire indicates that the vast majority of these subjects expected their partner not to follow their message. I conduct two new experiments explicitly designed to test for a 'pure' aversion to lying, and find no evidence for the existence of such a motivation. I discuss the implications of the findings for moral behavior and rule following more generally.

Country:

Germany

Kind of Data:

behavioral experiment; laboratory

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Citation Requirement:

we would like to make these data and instrcutions material freely available. People using the data should cite the data/publication

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Vanberg, Christoph (2016). Who never tells a lie? Experimental Economics

Identification Number:

10.1007/s10683-016-9491-2

Bibliographic Citation:

Vanberg, Christoph (2016). Who never tells a lie? Experimental Economics

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Lies.ztt

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Original z-Tree file

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application/octet-stream

Other Study-Related Materials

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Lies_Data.txt

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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

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lies_ztree_export.txt

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Text export of z-Tree file

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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

Other Study-Related Materials

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other_treatment.ztt

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Original z-Tree file

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application/octet-stream

Other Study-Related Materials

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other_treatment_ztree_export.txt

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Text export of z-Tree file

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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

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SESSION1.xls

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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension).

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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

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SESSION2.xls

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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension).

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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

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SESSION3.xls

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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension).

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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

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SESSION4.xls

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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension).

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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII

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Supplementary_Material.pdf

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application/pdf