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Part 1: Document Description
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Citation |
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Title: |
Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs] |
Identification Number: |
doi:10.11588/data/10087 |
Distributor: |
heiDATA |
Date of Distribution: |
2016-10-20 |
Version: |
1 |
Bibliographic Citation: |
Vanberg, Christoph, 2016, "Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10087, heiDATA, V1 |
Citation |
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Title: |
Who never tells a lie? [Data set and Programs] |
Identification Number: |
doi:10.11588/data/10087 |
Authoring Entity: |
Vanberg, Christoph (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics) |
Producer: |
Vanberg, Christoph |
Date of Production: |
2016 |
Distributor: |
heiDATA |
Distributor: |
heiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data Repository |
Access Authority: |
Christoph Vanberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany, Phone: +49 6221 54 2912, Fax: +49 6221 54 3592 |
Date of Deposit: |
2016-10-18 |
Holdings Information: |
https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10087 |
Study Scope |
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Keywords: |
Social Sciences, Lying, Deception, Morality, Ethics, Experiments |
Topic Classification: |
C91, D83 |
Abstract: |
I experimentally investigate the hypothesis that many people avoid lying even in a situation where doing so would result in a Pareto improvement. Replicating (Erat and Gneezy, Management Science 58, 723-733, 2012), I find that a significant fraction of subjects tell the truth in a sender-receiver game where both subjects earn a higher payoff when the partner makes an incorrect guess regarding the roll of a die. However, a non-incentivized questionnaire indicates that the vast majority of these subjects expected their partner not to follow their message. I conduct two new experiments explicitly designed to test for a 'pure' aversion to lying, and find no evidence for the existence of such a motivation. I discuss the implications of the findings for moral behavior and rule following more generally. |
Country: |
Germany |
Kind of Data: |
behavioral experiment; laboratory |
Methodology and Processing |
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Sources Statement |
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Data Access |
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Citation Requirement: |
we would like to make these data and instrcutions material freely available. People using the data should cite the data/publication |
Other Study Description Materials |
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Related Publications |
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Citation |
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Title: |
Vanberg, Christoph (2016). Who never tells a lie? Experimental Economics |
Identification Number: |
10.1007/s10683-016-9491-2 |
Bibliographic Citation: |
Vanberg, Christoph (2016). Who never tells a lie? Experimental Economics |
Label: |
Lies.ztt |
Text: |
Original z-Tree file |
Notes: |
application/octet-stream |
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Lies_Data.txt |
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Notes: |
text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
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lies_ztree_export.txt |
Text: |
Text export of z-Tree file |
Notes: |
text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
Label: |
other_treatment.ztt |
Text: |
Original z-Tree file |
Notes: |
application/octet-stream |
Label: |
other_treatment_ztree_export.txt |
Text: |
Text export of z-Tree file |
Notes: |
text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
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SESSION1.xls |
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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension). |
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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
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SESSION2.xls |
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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension). |
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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
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SESSION3.xls |
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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension). |
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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
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SESSION4.xls |
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Original files produced by z-Tree (wrong extension). |
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text/plain; charset=US-ASCII |
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Supplementary_Material.pdf |
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Notes: |
application/pdf |