Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations (doi:10.11588/data/10032)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations

Identification Number:

doi:10.11588/data/10032

Distributor:

heiDATA

Date of Distribution:

2014-10-28

Version:

Bibliographic Citation:

Vanberg, Christoph, 2014, "Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10032, heiDATA, V2, UNF:5:LLxs3XkQ6C/SySd6VWVBWQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations

Identification Number:

doi:10.11588/data/10032

Authoring Entity:

Vanberg, Christoph (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)

Producer:

Vanberg, Christoph

Date of Production:

2007

Software used in Production:

2.3.1

Distributor:

heiDATA

Distributor:

HeiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data Repository

Access Authority:

Vanberg, Christoph

Date of Deposit:

2014-10-24

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10032

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Promises, contracts, obligations, guilt aversion, beliefs, behavioral economics, experimental economics

Topic Classification:

C91, D03

Abstract:

Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games. This paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect. The first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word. The second assumes that people dislike letting down others' payoff expectations. According to the latter account, promises affect behavior only indirectly, because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others. I conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations. The results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations. This suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se.

Date of Collection:

2007-2007

Country:

Germany

Geographic Coverage:

Germany

Universe:

Students (lab)

Kind of Data:

Data from a laboratory experiment involving computer-mediated communication in a strategic interaction (social dilemma).

Methodology and Processing

Data Collector:

Vanberg, Christoph

Sampling Procedure:

student subject pool, online recruitment

Mode of Data Collection:

computerized

Type of Research Instrument:

Data from a laboratory experiment involving computer-mediated communication in a strategic interaction (social dilemma).

Sources Statement

Data Sources:

new data

Documentation and Access to Sources:

promisesv19.0.ztt: zTree program (zTree version 2.3.1) Screen*.eps: screen shots (in german) Translation of screens.pdf english translation of the screens Translation of instructions.pdf english translation of instructions (German available upon request) readme_data.txt information on the other files *.dat, *.tab, promises.do: see readme_data.txt LIST OF FILES: baseline.dat - Stata data file for "communication" and "no communication" treatments discussed in Appendix A switch.dat - Stata data file for "switching" treatments discussed in Section 4 promises.do - Stata code for tables, non-parametric tests, and regressions messages_baseline.tab - Tab delimited file containing text messages send in the baseline communication treatment, as well as the coded dummy "promise" messages_switch.tab - Analogous to previous file for the "partner switching" treatment NOTE: In order to run the .do file, you will need to adjust the paths to point to the appropriate directory.

Data Access

Citation Requirement:

Please cite Vanberg, C. (2008).

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Vanberg, C. (2008), Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations. Econometrica, 76: 1467–1480.

Identification Number:

10.3982/ECTA7673

Bibliographic Citation:

Vanberg, C. (2008), Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations. Econometrica, 76: 1467–1480.

File Description--f319

File: baseline.tab

Number of cases: 512
No. of variables per record: 8
Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:5:nTmXCGeQ8brNN86vGcFrKw==

File Description--f320

File: switch.tab

Number of cases: 1536
No. of variables per record: 13
Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:5:LmK+cqkZpiDzmrI7Rj+AoQ==

Variable Description

List of Variables:

t - Period
subject - Subject
type - 1= Dictator 0=recipient
roll - subject rolled
treat - 0=no communication 1=communication
fob - First order belief
sob - Second order belief
promise - subject promised
session
t
subject
type - 1=Dictator 0=recipient
roll - subject rolled
show_own - subject reviewed own chat
show_other - subject viewed new partner's chat
switch - partner was switched
sob - Second order belief
pfob - Partner first order belief
fob - First order belief
promise - Gave a promise
pr_promise - Partner received a promise during chat

Variables

Period

f319 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:gDm5TRMOZ4ct6xa4dCz5LA==

Subject

f319 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:oHGXiQhKnYCJgl9ma1HTsg==

1= Dictator 0=recipient

f319 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:tzH2Zyti5fZljHFV8oZeTg==

subject rolled

f319 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:BxilckzYGMx7xBVZUwSSRg==

0=no communication 1=communication

f319 Location:

Value	Label	Frequency	Text
1.	Communication	0
0.	No Communication	0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:1QjhmbupWAvAdeuYKAZuTQ==

First order belief

f319 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:c1AHJ+0UXSz+bcDk5T6ONA==

Second order belief

f319 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:TDaCYiFs03Y8nB4MHOB3AA==

subject promised

f319 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:fd0mYohBvUPMg2wOfUKxNA==

session

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:Sxp/4vgfo1H6M8/+7QWU2A==

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:z2uSyp9plWm0ECokbuVK1A==

subject

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:AxlQQYZdOaLcAvAIGGmmRA==

1=Dictator 0=recipient

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:2GGNyyMDtKMBv3tdFWHgqQ==

subject rolled

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:vajsOHj0sFRhxnFV4oEfmw==

subject reviewed own chat

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:DykeRZQ/j8rH2fdgXd4gUQ==

subject viewed new partner's chat

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:GuPG85SoekRPN25+eKPXZg==

partner was switched

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:tMTBV6C4SsEoqKCvzqXo+Q==

Second order belief

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:FIhHGaz9l7QK/IvGpxM5yg==

Partner first order belief

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:Oq9rAVIcZoJO0hWKQthk/Q==

First order belief

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:qpWuHuXHibVQoKbCAeYu2A==

Gave a promise

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:VRIc/BdsVVuhhibftymsDg==

Partner received a promise during chat

f320 Location:

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:5:ut7p4l8ndKSil2FV1c76Rw==