Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets? [Dataset] (doi:10.11588/data/10020)

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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets? [Dataset]

Identification Number:

doi:10.11588/data/10020

Distributor:

heiDATA

Date of Distribution:

2014-07-31

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Jörg, 2014, "Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets? [Dataset]", https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10020, heiDATA, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets? [Dataset]

Identification Number:

doi:10.11588/data/10020

Authoring Entity:

Huck, Steffen

Normann, Hans-Theo

Oechssler, Jörg (Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics)

Producer:

Huck, Steffen

Normann, Hans-Theo

Oechssler, Jörg

Distributor:

heiDATA

Distributor:

HeiDATA: Heidelberg Research Data Repository

Access Authority:

Oechssler, Jörg

Date of Deposit:

2014-07-31

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10020

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Information, Collusion, Prices versus quantities, Imitation

Topic Classification:

L13, C92, C72

Abstract:

This paper investigates the impact the publication of firm-specific data has on the competitiveness of experimental oligopoly markets. We compare two treatments: in one, firms are informed about their rivals’ actions and profits. In the other, firms are only given aggregate information about their rivals’ actions (average quantities or prices). We find that more information leads to more competition. In the treatment where aggregate information is given, we confirm the theoretical result that Bertrand markets are more competitive than Cournot markets.

Country:

Germany

Geographic Coverage:

Germany

Universe:

Students

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Jörg, "Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets?", International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (2000), 39-57.

Identification Number:

10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00033-8

Bibliographic Citation:

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Jörg, "Does Information about Competitors' Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets?", International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (2000), 39-57.

Other Study-Related Materials

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data IJIO 2000.xlsx

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LZA.tar.gz

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